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Abstract
This paper presents a practical side-channel attack that identifies the
social web service account of a visitor to an attacker’s website. Our attack
leverages the widely adopted user-blocking mechanism, abusing its inher-
ent property that certain pages return different web content depending
on whether a user is blocked from another user. Our key insight is that
an account prepared by an attacker can hold an attacker-controllable bi-
nary state of blocking/non-blocking with respect to an arbitrary user on
the same service; provided that the user is logged in to the service, this
state can be retrieved as one-bit data through the conventional cross-site
timing attack when a user visits the attacker’s website. We generalize
and refer to such a property as visibility control, which we consider as
the fundamental assumption of our attack. Building on this primitive, we
show that an attacker with a set of controlled accounts can gain a com-
plete and flexible control over the data leaked through the side channel.
Using this mechanism, we show that it is possible to design and imple-
ment a robust, large-scale user identification attack on a wide variety of
social web services. To verify the feasibility of our attack, we perform an
extensive empirical study using 16 popular social web services and demon-
strate that at least 12 of these are vulnerable to our attack. Vulnerable
services include not only popular social networking sites such as Twitter
and Facebook, but also other types of web services that provide social
features, e.g., eBay and Xbox Live. We also demonstrate that the at-
tack can achieve nearly 100% accuracy and can finish within a sufficiently
short time in a practical setting. We discuss the fundamental principles,
practical aspects, and limitations of the attack as well as possible defenses.
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1 Introduction
The Social web has become ubiquitous in our daily lives. It includes not only
popular social networking services such as Facebook and Twitter but also other
forms of web services with social features, e.g., online services for video games
such as XBox Live and online auction/shopping sites such as eBay. Social
web services facilitate interactions between people with similar interests. The
widespread adoption of social webs has increased not only the number of users
per service but also the number of services used by each user. Smith [1] reports
that Internet users have an average of five or more social accounts.
Like many other web services, social webs have security and privacy con-
cerns. What distinguishes social webs from other web services is that they
have an intrinsic privacy risk; users are encouraged to share large amounts of
personal/sensitive information on these services, e.g., personal photos, health
information, home addresses, employment status, and sexual preferences. An
attacker can collate various data from social web services to infer individuals’
personal information. For example, as Minkus et al. [2] revealed, an attacker
can recover a target’s purchase history if s/he knows the target’s eBay account.
The purchases may include potentially sensitive items, e.g., gun-related items
or medical tests. To protect privacy, an eBay user may use a pseudonym for
his/her account name; even in such a case, however, an attacker who can link an
eBay account with an account on Facebook, which encourages users to disclose
their real name, can infer the identity of the actual person who purchased the
sensitive items on eBay.
In this study, we introduce a side-channel attack that identifies the social
account(s) of a website visitor. The key idea behind our approach is to leverage
user blocking, which is an indispensable mechanism to thwart various types of
harassment in social webs, e.g., trolling, unwanted sexual solicitation, or cyber
bullying. Because user blocking is a generic function commonly adopted by
a wide range of social web services, an attacker can target various social web
services. In fact, our attack is applicable to at least the following various social
web services: Ashley Madison, eBay, Facebook, Google+, Instagram, Medium,
Pornhub, Roblox, Tumblr, Twitter, Xbox Live, and Xvideos. Because having
an account with some of the services included on this list could involve privacy-
sensitive information, any account identification can directly lead to privacy
risks.
Our attack leverages the user-blocking mechanism as a means of generat-
ing the leaking signals used for the side-channel attack1. More specifically, we
leverage the mechanism’s inherent property that certain pages return differ-
ent web content depending on whether or not a user is blocked from another
user. Our key insight is that an account prepared by an attacker can hold an
attacker-controllable binary state of blocking/non-blocking, with respect to an
arbitrary user on the service, and this state can be retrieved as one-bit data
through cross-site request forgery and a timing side channel when a user visits
1More precisely, our side-channel attack is classified as a cross-site timing attack that will
be described in Section 3.1.
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the attacker’s website. We specially refer to this key action as visibility con-
trol in this paper, We specifically refer to the property which enables this key
action as visibility control in this paper, as an attacker is forcing another user
to change how they see certain things in the system. Building on this primi-
tive, we show that an attacker can use a set of controlled accounts to construct
a controllable side channel, i.e, leaked data is completely under the attacker’s
control. Using this mechanism, we show that it is possible to design and im-
plement a robust, large-scale user identification attack mechanism on a wide
variety of social web services. We note that the number of accounts required
has a theoretically logarithmic relation to the number of users to be targeted,
e.g., 20 attacker-prepared accounts are needed to cover 1 million users. The
novelty of our attack is discussed further in Section 3.3.
We note that disabling our side channel, i.e., user blocking, requires careful
assessment as it is a crucial function that is widely used on social webs. As
we will discuss in Section 2.2, an analysis of 223,487 Twitter users revealed
that 3,770 users have blocked more than 1,000 accounts. Our online survey also
revealed that 52.3%/41.4% of Twitter/Facebook users have responded they have
used the blocking mechanism before, and 92.4%/93.9% responded there should
not be a limit on the number of blocks. These results suggest that neither
disabling blocking nor posing a limit on it, is desirable from the viewpoints of
the actual usage of the service and users’ expectations. Furthermore, as we
show in Section 5.3, limiting the number of user blocks per account would not
be an effective countermeasure owing to our additional technique, user-space
partitioning.
To verify the feasibility of our attack, we performed extensive empirical
studies using 16 existing social web services. As mentioned above, we found
that 12 of these services are vulnerable to the attack. Using 20 actual accounts,
we found that the attack succeeds with nearly 100% accuracy under a practical
setting.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We demonstrate that the user-blocking mechanism, which is an indispensable
function widely adopted in various social web services, can be exploited as
the leaking signals for a side-channel attack that identifies user accounts.
• In addition to the side-channel attack, we develop several techniques to accu-
rately identify users’ accounts. We also reveal that this attack is applicable
to many currently existing services. The attack has a high success rate of
nearly 100%, and is high-speed, taking as short as 4–8 seconds in a preferable
setting, or 20-98 seconds even in a crude environment with a large amount
of delay.
• We discuss the principles, the practical aspects, and the limitations of this
study, as well as some defenses against the attack.
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Figure 1: The differences of appearance between non-blocking (left) and block-
ing (right) pages on Facebook.
2 Background: User Blocking
In this section, we first provide a technical overview of user blocking, which
serves as a side channel used for the user identification attack. Next, we demon-
strate that simply disabling/limiting this side channel is not a desirable solution
against the attack from the viewpoints of actual usage and user expectations.
2.1 Technical Overview
User blocking is a means of blocking communication between two users. Note
that some “blocking” mechanisms adopted by social web services are not user
blocking per se but message blocking, e.g., “muting” or “ignoring”. While user
blocking rejects a person access to your account, message blocking filters out all
the messages (or notifications) originating from that person. Even if a person
is blocked with message blocking, this does not necessarily mean that they do
not have access to your online activities. In this paper, we will not focus on
message blocking unless otherwise noted.
Social web services with user-blocking mechanisms have intrinsic web pages
that change content depending on the status of the visitor, i.e., whether or not a
visitor is blocked from another person. A typical example is a user profile data
page, which provides information on a person such as a photograph (icon), a
self-introduction, affiliation, recent posts/updates, etc. Figure 1 shows screen-
shots of some Facebook profile pages. In the non-blocked state, the user profile
information is fully available; in the blocked state, these pieces of information
are hidden. In addition to a user profile page, some social web services provide
pages that reflect similar differences. A summary of such techniques is presented
in Section 4.
To execute user blocking, a user typically clicks the “block” button set on the
profile page of the person to be blocked or enters the account ID of the person
in a text box shown on a dedicated page for user blocking. Even though official
application programming interfaces (APIs) for performing user blocking are not
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Table 1: Demography of the expectations survey.
# respondents Gender Age (Years)
10–29 / 30–49 / 50–
Facebook 198 F:54 M:46 (%) 31 / 60 / 9 (%)
Twitter 170 F:56 M:44 (%) 41 / 51 / 8 (%)
necessarily provided on all social web services, to the best of our knowledge no
services adopt a special mechanism, such as CAPTCHA, to prevent automated
user-blocking requests. Therefore, it is currently easy to perform the large-scale
user blocking necessary to implement our user identification attack by using a
script that emulates authentic requests or a headless browser.
2.2 Usage and Expectations
In this subsection, we discuss how many accounts do people block on social web
services and why they do so. To answer the “how many” question, we first
present statistics derived from the data collected at “Blocked By Me” [3], a
web service that displays a list of users a person has blocked on Twitter1. The
data, comprising the number of blocked users for 223,487 unique accounts, were
collected from March 2011 to August 2017. As an individual may have used the
web service for several times during the measurement period, we adopt the max-
imum value of the numbers of blocked users measured for each person. Figure 2
shows the log-log complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of
the number of blocked users per account. It is seen that the distribution is
heavy-tailed, indicating that, although the majority of users blocked a small
number of other accounts (median = 15), a non-negligible number of users had
to block a large number of other accounts. For instance, 3,770 users blocked
more than 1,000 accounts. Note that the rate-limit of access to Twitter API
truncates the number of blocked users at 75,000; thus, users indicated in the
figure as having blocked 75,000 users are likely to have actually blocked more.
Besides this upper bound, there were several groups of accounts having the
same large number of blocked accounts. They may be using a shared block
list to evade various harassments. As checking the content of such lists is not
feasible, some users may have simply cumulatively added new accounts to their
block lists. These insights account for the reason why several users have a large
number of blocked users.
Next, to answer the “why” question we recruited participants to take an
online survey. As summarized in Table 1, the demography of the respondents
shows that responses represent a diverse, cross-section of respondents. Key find-
ings derived from the closed-ended questions are as follows: (1) 52.3%/41.4% of
Twitter/Facebook users responded that they have used the blocking mechanism;
(2) 92.4%/93.9% of Twitter/Facebook users responded that social web service
should not limit the number of accounts a person can block on the service. This
1The data are provided on the courtesy of Gerry Mulvenna [3]. The entire set was
anonymized to protect user privacy.
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Figure 2: Log-log CCDF of the number of user blocks per account on Twitter.
Mean value is 154.21.
result indicates that users do not expect to have limitations on the number of
blockable users. We also included the open-ended questions: “why do you block
other users?” and “why do you think that there should be no limitation on
the number of blocked users?” Typical answers to the first question include
“do not want to read the unwanted messages/posts” and “not to be tracked
by strangers/trolls/ex-friends/coworkers, etc.” Typical answers to the second
question include “there are a huge number of spam/bogus accounts” and “just
adding unwanted users to the blocklist is easy to maintain.”
The observations derived from the web service log analysis and the online
survey imply that simply disabling our side channel, user-blocking, is not a
desirable countermeasure against the threat from the viewpoints of actual usage
of a service and users’ expectations.
3 Attack Overview
In this section, we give a brief overview of the attack. We present the threat
model and the attack flow with a concrete example. We also elaborate on the
novelty of the attack and how it compares to some of the existing works in this
area.
3.1 Threat Model
In this attack, the attacker’s goal is to determine the social account of the visitors
to her/his website. We present two possible attack scenarios under this goal. In
the first, the attacker targets unspecified mass users in order to determine who
visited the attacker’s website, for the purpose of, e.g., marketing. In the second
scenario the attacker targets a limited number of users with already known
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identities, such as their names or email addresses, and wants to determine their
anonymous accounts which cannot be searched for using such identities. In both
scenarios, the visitor’s privacy is obviously breached, as the identity of the user
or their private activity is revealed to the attacker without their consent.
Our attack employs a cross-site timing attack, which is an attack that com-
bines cross-site request forgery (CSRF) and a timing attack [4]. Cross-site tim-
ing attacks bypass the same-origin policy and enable an attacker to obtain infor-
mation using the target’s view of another site, i.e., in our context, the attacker
can know whether or not the target user is blocked by the attacker-prepared
signaling accounts. As we detail in Section 4, the status of blocked/non-blocked
can be estimated from the time a web server of a social web takes to load a
web content, or the round-trip time (RTT), of the profile page of a signaling
account. As such, we make the following assumptions, which we will discuss in
additional detail in Section 7.
Attack Trigger. We assume that the attacker can somehow induce their tar-
get to visit a malicious website. For example, the attacker uses malvertising
techniques [5] or simply sends out email messages, in which case they can also
link e-mail addresses to social accounts. Further details on this are discussed in
Section 7.
Log-in Status. We assume that a target person has logged into the social
web services, i.e., that cookies are enabled on the person’s web browser. This
assumption plays a vital role in the success of the attack because the logged-in
status triggers the difference between views of profiles of blocking and non-
blocking accounts. Because the majority of web services, e.g., Facebook, have
an automatic sign-in option, we consider this assumption to be reasonable.
User Device. We assume that the target person uses a PC when accessing
the malicious website. This premise covers more than 70% of social web service
users [6]. Users of mobile platforms typically access social web services through
dedicated mobile apps instead of the web interface provided for mobile browsers.
Therefore, we cannot easily apply the attack to a mobile device.
3.2 Attack Flow and Example
As illustrated in Figure 3, our attack has two separate phases: the side-channel
control phase and the side-channel retrieval phase. Below, we describe the steps
in each phase with a concrete example. Note that some details are omitted for
simplicity but will be described in later sections.
I. Side-Channel Control Phase
The purpose of the side-channel control phase is to construct user-identifiable
side-channel data through user blocking. This phase is required just once before
performing the attack.
Step 1. Target Enumeration: For a social web service of interest, the
attacker first enumerates the users who will be the target of the attack. Let N be
the number of targets. The attacker can target either mass (randomly sampled
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I. Side-Channel Control Phase
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II. Side-Channel Retrieval Phase
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Step 1: User’s Visit
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y
Carol
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S3’s profile
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Step 3: User Identification
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Figure 3: Attack overview
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or even all) user accounts or a limited set of selected users (e.g., celebrities,
high-level corporate officers) according to the attacker’s purpose. Large-scale,
efficient enumeration of social accounts can be achieved in several ways, as
in [7, 8]. Note that because this attack leverages CSRF, whether the account
is closed (e.g., private, protected) is not a concern as long as the account is
blockable.
In the example, the attacker lists a small set of N = 8 users who will be the
target of the attack. If the attack succeeds, the attacker will be able to identify
the accounts of these eight users whenever they visit the attacker’s website while
logged onto the social web services.
Step 2. Bit Assignment: The attacker prepares m accounts on the social
web service where m is a number satisfying 2m ≥ N ; these accounts are referred
to as “signaling accounts” and denoted as Si, i = 1 . . .m. The attacker encodes
a set of target users into bit arrays with length m, with the value of the i-th
bit of each array corresponding to “block” (1) or “do not block” (0) by account
Si. The attacker can express a maximum of 2
m distinct target users, but at the
cost of increase in m, the attacker can further add redundant bits to produce
an error-correcting code.
In the example, the attacker prepares m = 3 signaling accounts, S1, S2, and S3,
with each target user is mapped into distinct bit arrays of length m, as shown
in the table. All possible bit patterns are mapped to the users and there are no
redundant bits.
Step 3. Target Blocking: The attacker controls the signaling accounts
to block each target user according to the bit array. Note that the number of
blocking that must be performed per signaling account is approximately half
of the total number of targets, as shown in the figure. It is not difficult to see
that this requirement can be controlled at the cost of adding more redundant
signaling accounts, i.e., the block/non-block table in the figure will become more
sparse.
In the example, S1 is configured to block Erin, Frank, Grace, and Heidi, with
the remaining four users left non-blocked (default). S2 and S3 are configured in
a similar manner.
II. Side-Channel Retrieval Phase
The purpose of the side-channel retrieval phase is to identify the user utilizing
the data retrieved through the timing side channel. This phase is executed every
time a user accesses the attacker’s website.
Step 1. User’s Visit: When a user visits the web server under the control
of the attacker, JavaScript code is downloaded and is executed on the user’s
browser.
Step 2. RTT Measurement: The JavaScript code (as detailed in Bortz [4])
measures the time taken to load the profile of the signaling accounts by sending
HTTP requests to each of these accounts. Note that, as this is a CSRF, the
request is issued on behalf of the user’s account. Special RTT measurements
9
are also performed to determine the threshold value used in the next step, but
we omit the details here.
In the example, the script issues HTTP requests to the profile page of each of
the signaling accounts — S1, S2, and S3 — and receives the measurements of
214, 128, and 223 ms, respectively.
Step 3. User Identification: The attacker then tries to identify the user
from the measurements acquired in the preceding step. Because the time needed
to load the profile of a blocking account exhibits a statistical difference from that
needed to load the profile of a non-blocking account, the sequence of measured
time samples can be used to build a bit array of “blocked” and “non-blocked”
states. Once the bit array is recovered, the attacker does a lookup on the bit
array map and identifies the user.
In the example, the measurements, 214, 128, 223 ms are compared against a
threshold value of, say, 150 ms, and are determined to be non-blocked, blocked,
and non-blocked, respectively. This result is represented as a bit array {010},
enabling the attacker to infer from the table that the user who visited the
malicious site is Carol1.
3.3 Novelty of the Attack
While our attack is certainly novel overall, its conceptual novelty lies primar-
ily in the side-channel control phase rather than in the side-channel retrieval
phase, which can be implemented using many different existing approaches in
addition to that adopted in our implementation [4]. The side-channel control
phase is made particularly novel by its use of the underlying concept of visi-
bility control, which allows for the encoding and retrieving of arbitrary bits of
data independent of what the side channel is. This flexibility inherently enables
the attack to achieve account identification in a generic manner. By contrast,
most similar methods that exploit browser side channels focus on stealing the
content of a specific resource, limiting the acquirable data to that related to
the targeted resource. Rather than studying such resource-specific side-channel
acquisition methodologies, we questioned and exploited the design of general
systems equipped with visibility-control features, e.g., user blocking. To the
best of our knowledge, this concept has not been previously discussed in the
literature despite its significant potential impact on nearly all major social web
services currently operating.
We now compare our work to two of the major recent studies in this area.
The goal of the first study was to retrieve various user data (e.g., age, contacts,
search history) through several browser side-channel techniques [9]. The major
difference between this work and ours is that it was somewhat focused on the
development of individual techniques to acquire resource-specific side channels.
Although this makes their methodology more powerful in the sense that it can
1As we will detail in Section 5, when {000} is observed, it is still possible to distinguish
Alice from non-target users by using two special accounts that do/don’t block all the target
users.
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even reveal a user’s private information (e.g., search history), their methodology
and goals were more service- and resource-specific. By contrast, the purpose of
our work is to find user accounts and then link these with all available public
information to which they are tied independent of the target resource used for
sending side-channel data. Another similar study involved an attack based on
browser history stealing [10], which, in the authors’ words, shared a goal similar
to ours of user identification or de-anonymization. This approach exploited
the (now eliminated) mechanism allowing an attacker to infer a user’s browser
history to determine if the user belongs to certain groups based on the presence
of access history to certain pages. Methodology-wise, the concept of repetitively
identifying the groups to which a target user belongs, until to the point where
the target can be uniquely identified, is conceptually similar to our approach.
The main difference, however, is that our method allows for the construction
of such groups in advance in an arbitrary manner. Thus, while our approach
requires some initial setup effort, it has the advantage of being much more
reliable in assuring identification (i.e., no ambiguity remains due to a lack of
groups) as long as the side channel can be correctly retrieved.
4 User-blocking Side Channel
This section aims to demonstrate that the differences between the time to load
profile pages of blocked and non-blocked users can be used to perform a tim-
ing attack. In the following, we first look at the characteristics of the RTTs
measured for blocked and non-blocked accounts. Next, we present several tech-
niques that can increase the distinguishability of RTTs. Finally, after applying
the RTT expansion techniques, we test whether the RTTs are statistically distin-
guishable using various social web services, which include popular social media
such as Twitter and Facebook and other web services such as eBay and XBox
Live.
4.1 Characteristics of RTTs
Here, we briefly describe the setup for our experiments. We executed a sim-
ple JavaScript code on a browser logged-in to a service with account A. The
JavaScript issues GET requests to a page associated with an account which
blocks A, and another page associated with an account that does not block A.
Our objective is to see whether we can see the differences in the RTT measure-
ments associated with these two types of accounts: blocking and non-blocking.
In the following, we characterize the measured RTTs using three social web
services, Facebook, Twitter, and Tumblr as the representative examples. We
study other services in the next subsection. Figure 4 shows the distributions
of the measured RTTs. For Facebook, there is a clear gap between the RTT
distributions for blocking and non-blocking accounts. For Tumblr, even though
two distributions are closer, we see the difference between the distributions.
We study whether or not this slight differences can be used as the timing side
11
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Figure 4: Distributions of RTTs for blocking and non-blocking accounts.
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Twitter (profile page content filled)
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Figure 5: Distributions of RTTs for blocking and non-blocking accounts, after filling the
Twitter user profile page with content
channel in Section 6. For Twitter, the distributions suggest that there is no
sufficient difference to distinguish their RTT difference. Nevertheless, we have
discovered that it is possible to intentionally amplify their RTT difference by
posting more content to the profile page. More details on this will be described
in the next subsection.
Note that, while we see longer RTTs for non-blocking accounts on Tumblr,
we see longer RTTs for blocking accounts on Facebook. It is natural that the
profile pages of blocking accounts are loaded quickly because the content of these
pages may be lighter than those of the profile pages of non-blocking accounts.
While not conclusive, we conjecture that this could be because Facebook does
not utilize its server-side on-memory cache at all when generating content for
the case of blocked. In either case, we can distinguish between the blocked and
non-blocked states using the RTT measurements.
4.2 Improving RTT Distinguishability
We present three techniques that can make the differences in the RTTs more
prominent, i.e., these are the ways to make the timing attack more successful.
Change of content size. The first technique is to place as much information
as possible on the user profile pages of the signaling accounts. This technique
can increase the time to load the profile page when the signaling account of
the page is visible to the target, i.e., the signaling account does not block the
target. We performed a simple experiment using Twitter. We prepared two
Twitter accounts, one with the default setting and another with the maximum
amount of content (texts and URL links) that appears on the profile page.
Figure 5 shows the RTT distributions after filling the profile page with large
amounts of content. Comparing this with Figure 4 (b) which shows the RTT
distributions before adding the content, we now have a clear difference between
blocked and non-blocked RTTs, suggesting that this technique can dramatically
improve their distinguishability.
Use of different pages. Another technique is to make use of various pages
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other than the user profile page. In many cases, the page subject to blocking
is the user profile page, which displays the user’s basic information or recent
posts. However, depending on the service or their implementation, there are
cases where observable differences do not appear on the profile page but do
appear on other pages. For example, on eBay, a user cannot prohibit another
user from accessing their profile page; however, a user can prohibit another
user from bidding on the items they list. In other words, the content on the
item page would yield a difference depending on whether the viewing user is
blocked by the owner of the item. Leveraging this fact, by preparing an item
beforehand and making the victim send requests to the item page instead of the
profile page, the attacker would be able to observe the RTT difference required
for the attack.
Similarly, Flickr does not prohibit a blocked user from viewing the blocker’s
profile page, but it does prohibit the blocked user from sending a message to the
blocker. More specifically, there is a page for sending a messages to other users
and, if the sender is not blocked from the receiver, a text area and a submit
button are displayed on the page; however, if blocked, these objects are not
shown and a warning message is displayed. Such a difference may also yield the
RTT difference necessary for our attack.
In addition, some pages with AJAX-based implementation have a structure
where after requesting and rendering the initial HTML content, they request
additional content, e.g., a JSON content, from another URL using JavaScript’s
XMLHttpRequest. In some services, the blocked/non-blocked difference is only
present in the JSON data that is acquired afterwards, instead of in the HTML
content acquired first. The problem with this situation is that the RTT mea-
surement script used for cross-site timing attacks does not actually render the
acquired page content; therefore, the RTT of the content acquired afterward
from JavaScript cannot be measured. In such cases, the attacker must directly
send requests to the URL for the JSON data. In our investigation, we found
that Tumblr and Xbox.com had this structure, but we were able to make the
attack feasible by switching the request destination to the JSON URL instead
of the HTML URL.
4.3 Distinguishability of RTTs
We tested whether the RTTs for blocking and non-blocking accounts were sta-
tistically distinguishable. To this end, we leveraged the Mann-Whitney U test,
which is a nonparametric statistical test used to compare differences between
two independent samples; it tests whether a randomly selected value from one
sample is less than or greater than a randomly selected value from another sam-
ple. For our experiments, we picked 16 popular social web services. For each
service, we measured the RTTs between blocking/non-blocking accounts and
the blocked account. We applied the Mann-Whitney U test and computed the
p-values. The results are summarized in Table 2. The results show that all
services have low p-values and imply that the distributions are distinguishable
in 12 out of 16 services when the significance level is 0.01.
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Table 2: Social web services with user-blocking mechanism. ∆0.05 shows the
difference in 5-percent tile values for blocked/non-blocked RTT measurements. Dist. is the
distinguishablity showing Y when the p-value less than 0.01. # of users are from various web
resources as of May 2017
Service Category # users ∆0.05 p-value Dist.
Facebook Social 1.96B 212 ms <0.0001 Y
Instagram Photo 700M 29 ms <0.0001 Y
Tumblr Microblog 550M 43 ms <0.0001 Y
Google+ Social 540M 1,080 ms <0.0001 Y
Twitter Microblog 328M 312 ms <0.0001 Y
eBay Shopping 167M 589 ms <0.0001 Y
PornHub Porn 75M 9 ms 0.0034 Y
Medium Forum 60M 332 ms <0.0001 Y
Xbox Live Game 52M 110 ms <0.0001 Y
Ashley Madison Dating 52M 8 ms 0.0097 Y
Roblox Game 48M 98 ms <0.0001 Y
Xvideos Porn 47M 16 ms <0.0001 Y
Quora Forum 190M 5 ms 0.4561 N
Flickr Photo 122M 1 ms 0.2678 N
DeviantArt Art 65M 11 ms 0.0674 N
Meetup Social 30M 9 ms 0.3878 N
5 User Identification Attack
In this section, we first formulate the user identification attack, which works
on the basis of the two building blocks, user-blocking and cross-site timing
attack. The attack introduces two functions, encoding and decoding, which are
the functions an attacker can arbitrarily set to map target users and leaking
information (RTTs). Next, we describe the techniques we developed for the
timing attack. Finally, we present two extensions of the attack. These extensions
aim to make the attack more successful.
5.1 Formulation
Let m and N denote the numbers of the signaling and target accounts, respec-
tively. We configure m as the minimum integer value that satisfies 2m ≥ N . If
an attacker wants to target one million of accounts, m is configured to m = 20.
In the setup phase, an attacker creates a table that maps target user accounts
to bit arrays with a length of m. Let Ui (i = 1, . . . , N) be the target user
accounts. For each Ui, the table has a bit array entry, Bi = {b1b2 . . . bm}, where
bj ∈ {0, 1} corresponds to a bit. We refer to the rule that maps Ui into Bi as
encoding, i.e.,
Bi = encode(Ui).
Next, we configure the signaling accounts, Sj (j = 1, . . . ,m) as follows. Let
θij ∈ {0, 1} (i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . ,m) be an indicator function that satisfies
θij =
{
1 if bij = 1 ,
0 else,
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where bij is the j-th bit of the bit array Bi. Then, for each signaling account,
Sj , the account is configured to block the user Ui if θij = 1. Because each bit
takes the value bij = 1 with a probability of 0.5, each signaling account needs to
block approximately N/2 target accounts. One may instantly come up with a
defense that poses a limit on the number of user-blocks an account can have. To
thwart such a countermeasure, we propose a technique described in Section 5.3.
In the attack phase, the attacker sets up a malicious website and lets target
users access it, following our threat model. As described in the previous section,
using the timing attack, the website can secretly measure RTTs for the m of
signaling accounts. Note that measurements can be parallelized to speed up the
process. Let Rj = {R1, R2, . . .} be the sequence of RTT measurements obtained
for the signaling account Sj . Using the techniques that will be described in the
next subsection, we estimate whether or not the target user is blocked by Sj .
Let b̂j ∈ {0, 1} denote the estimate of the blocked/non-blocked (1/0) from the
RTT measurements, i.e.,
b̂j = est(Rj).
Using the entire estimates, we have the estimate ofB as B̂ = {b̂1 . . . b̂m}. Finally,
we identify the target user using the table created in the setup phase; i.e.,
Û = decode(B̂).
In the next subsection, the estimation, b̂j = est(Rj), is described in detail.
5.2 Estimating Blocked/Non-blocked Status
Prior to the actual attack, we determine whether or not a visitor of the website
has been included in the target list, i.e., we employ a membership test. To
this end, we prepare the following two reference accounts: a closed account,
which blocks all users included in the list of target users, and an open account,
which does not block any users at all. We first measure the RTTs for each of
the closed and open accounts. The measurements consist of k0 trials for each
account, where we use multiple trials because the decision based on a one-shot
measurement may have errors due to jitter in the RTTs. The idea is to compare
the measured RTTs for closed/open accounts to see if they are significantly
different. If we observe a significant difference, we can conclude that the visitor
has been listed and continue the attack; otherwise, the visitor has not been
listed and the attack procedure is terminated.
To determine if the measured RTTs are for the closed or open accounts, we
again leverage the Mann-Whitney U test. Because the computation of the U test
is simple and lightweight, the membership test can be completed immediately
after we collect the RTTs. In this study, we adopted a significance level of
α = 0.01. We also need to configure the parameter k0. As shown in the next
section, we empirically derived a conservative value of k0 as k0 = 30, which
worked for various social web services.
After the attacker determines that the visitor is likely listed, the attacker
moves to the next step. Let C0.05 and O0.05 be the 5th-percentiles of the RTT
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values measured for the closed and open accounts, respectively. We adopt the
5th-percentile as the threshold to eliminate outliers. Note that, even though
we could use the minimum values for the RTTs as does the pathchar algorithm
does [11], we observed that the RTTs could include small outliers, which could
be caused by server-side mechanisms such as data caching or load balancing.
These values are used as the thresholds to estimate the blocked / non-blocked
state, i.e., for a measured RTT sequence for a signaling account Sj , we compute
the 5th-percentile of Rj as R0.05j . We do not necessarily make k, the number
of trials Sj , equal to k0. An attacker can adjust the k according to the his/her
requirements for the trade-offs between accuracy and speed. If the obtained
R0.05j is closer to C0.05, the attacker estimates the visitor has been blocked by
the signaling account Sj . Otherwise, s/he estimates the visitor has not been
blocked by the signaling account; i.e.,
b̂j =
{
1 if |R0.05j − C0.05| < |R0.05j −O0.05|,
0 else.
By continuing this process for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the attacker can estimate
the bit array of the visitor as B̂ = {b̂1 . . . b̂m}. Finally, the bit array can be
decoded into a user ID, Û = decode(B̂), using the procedure we have shown in
the previous subsection. Despite the simplicity of the procedure shown above,
as we show later, it can estimate the closed/open states very accurately.
5.3 Extensions
Here, we introduce two extensions of the attack, error-correction coding and
user-space partitioning, which aim to further improve the accuracy in noisy
environments and to enhance the size of the target when the number of blocks
per account is limited, respectively.
Error-correction Coding. Under a stable environment, accurately classifying
a bit is not difficult since sufficient significant difference between blocked/non-
blocked is present. This will also be shown later in Section 6. On the other
hand, abnormal RTTs due to some irregular factors such as temporary server
overload may lead to a bit-error. Needless to say, the infrastructures used in
services such as those listed in Table 2 which host 30 million to 2 billion users
tend to be quite resilient against such failures; nevertheless, we can still apply
error-correction algorithm in order to eliminate even the slight possibility of
identification failure due to noise.
In this paper, we adopt a Reed-Solomon code, which has a high error-
correction capability and is relatively easy to implement. In fact, as we will
demonstrate later, the use of the Reed-Solomon algorithm actually contributes
to improving the estimation accuracy in a noisy environment. Note that other
error-correction algorithms could be used for this purpose. To select the most
suitable error-correction algorithm, one must take into account several factors
such as the error probability distribution, the error characteristics such as bursts,
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and the requirements of the available computing resources. In this paper, we
are focused on the proof of concept; therefore, we consider choosing the best
error-correction algorithm to be out of the scope of this study.
The Reed-Solomon algorithm can correct up to K/2 symbol errors, where
K is the number of redundant symbols and r (bits) is the size of the symbol.
Because the number of bits initially allocated to each user is m, the number of
signaling accounts that needs to be prepared by the attacker is m + rK, i.e.,
the attacker needs to prepare an additional rK extra signaling accounts. In
the setup phase, the attacker first encodes the bit arrays allocated to each user
using a Reed-Solomon encoder, and then blocks the accounts from the signaling
accounts according to the bit values of the newly encoded bit array. In the attack
phase, by decoding the bit arrays obtained via the cross-site timing attack using
the Reed-Solomon decoder, the attacker can obtain an error-corrected bit array.
User-space Partitioning.
As described in Section 2.2, simply enforcing a limit on the number of blocks
would violate a user’s right to block and may result in a serious degradation of
the service quality. For services that still enforce a limit despite this negative
impact, the technique shown below would be effective. Letting this limit to be
L, the number of candidate target users covered for identification is also limited
to L when using the procedures we have introduced up to this point. To lift
this limitation, we can employ a technique we call user-space partitioning, which
in this case splits candidate users into S user spaces each containing L users,
allowing us to cover up to LS users in total.
In the setup phase, for each user space j ∈ {1, . . . , S}, an attacker prepares a
reference account that blocks all users belonging to the j-th user space and the
dlog2 Le of signaling accounts that are used to map the targets in the space. We
also prepare the two reference accounts, the closed and open accounts, which are
used as the basis of the RTT-based blocking/non-blocking estimation. In total,
the number of signaling/reference accounts required is Sdlog2 Le and S + 1,
respectively.
In the attack phase, the attacker (1) identifies which user space the target
user belongs to and then (2) identifies the target in the user space. In step (1),
as in the procedures described in the previous subsection, for each of reference
account, k requests are launched to determine the user space to which the target
belongs. Note that the RTT values obtained here can be reused as the training
data in step (2). In step (2), for each of the L users in the user space found in
step (1), the same identification process is performed as explained earlier. Note
that, because we use a different set of signaling accounts for each user space, the
request URL for the cross-site timing attack must be changed depending on the
outcome of step (1); however, this can be handled with conditional branches in
the JavaScript code.
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6 Field Experiments
In this section, we perform the field experiments. We first evaluate the key
success factor of the attack – RTT measurement, which plays a vital role in
classifying blocked/non-blocked status using the cross-site timing attack (Sec-
tion 6.1). Next, we evaluate the feasibility of our user identification attack;
namely, we study the identification success rate (Section 6.2) and time to com-
plete the attack (Section 6.3).
6.1 Accuracy of Bit Array Estimation
Due to space and time constraints, we evaluated the accuracy using RTT values
experimentally measured for the following three services: Facebook, Twitter,
and Tumblr. As shown in Table 2, these services have the top number of users
and, at the same time, had no limitations such as the limit on the number
of blockable users at the time of the experiment. In addition, as mentioned
in Section 4, each of these three services had different characteristics in the
blocked/non-blocked RTT difference: relatively large, medium, and small, re-
spectively.
The experiment was conducted by executing the JavaScript code on Google
Chrome installed on a consumer laptop PC and measuring the RTT. We pre-
pared the following three different network environments: wired LAN, Wi-Fi,
and tethering. The wired LAN and Wi-Fi are connected to a commercial Inter-
net Service Provider, and we assume that this is the environment of PC users
who are the main targets of our attack. Moreover, to prove that our attack is
feasible even in crude environmental conditions, we also tested the attack on
a tethering network hosted on an Android device connected to a 4G network
provided by a mobile network carrier.
Membership Test. We first tested the accuracy of the membership test. We
measured the RTT for each of the closed and open accounts. As mentioned
earlier, the measured RTT values are used for (1) the membership test and
(2) deriving the thresholds for the bit classification, which will be described
later. Note that an attacker needs to calibrate the thresholds before launching
the attack because the RTT values depend on the geographical location and
network environment.
We repeated the following experiment 100 times. While logged on to a target
and non-target account, we launched k0 trials for each account and decided
whether or not the account was included on the list by applying the Mann-
Whitney U test. We refer to the true positive rate (TPR) as the ratio of correctly
deciding that the target was included in the target, and the true negative rate
(TNR) as the ratio of correctly deciding that the target was not included on the
target list.
Figure 6 shows the relationship between k0 and TPR/TNR. When k0 is
small, we have a small number of samples to estimate the states. Nevertheless,
thanks to the strong distinguishability of the RTT distributions, TNR was 0.97
for all k0, i.e., there were very few false negatives, which are events where the
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Figure 6: Relationship between the number of trials (k0), and TPR/TNR.
Table 3: TPR and TNR for under various conditions.
Facebook Twitter Tumblr
TPR TNR TPR TNR TPR TNR
Chrome/Wired 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.99
Wireless 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.99
Tethering 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00
Firefox 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
IE 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00
target account was estimated as not being listed. Second, for TPR, we saw
degradation in the accuracy when k0 was small, especially for Tumblr. As k0
increases, however, the TPR approaches 1.0. When choosing the value of k0, it is
preferable that the accuracy is consistent and that we see a sufficient difference in
the samples. If k0 is large, the accuracy will increase but the number of trials will
also increase and the time needed for an attack would become too long. In this
experiment, we empirically chose k0 = 30, which achieved perfect estimations
for all the services. We will use the values of C0.05 and O0.05 calculated from
this k0 as the thresholds used in the next step.
The measured RTT values can be affected by various external factors such as
network latencies or the type of browser. We studied how these factors affected
the TPR/TNR. Table 3 shows the results. The number of trials was set to
k0 = 30.
Single Bit Classification. Next, we evaluated the accuracy of classifying
a single bit into blocking or non-blocking. Again, we used three social web
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Table 4: Accuracy of classifying a single bit for Wired(top), Wi-fi(middle), and
Tethering(bottom)
Facebook Twitter Tumblr
k TBR TNBR TBR TNBR TBR TNBR
1 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.67 0.99
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.89 0.99
5 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.98
10 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00
20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
30 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.84 0.99
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00
5 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
10 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
30 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.68 0.99
3 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.92 0.99
5 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.98 1.00
10 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
30 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
services, Facebook, Twitter, and Tumblr. For each service, we performed k
trials of RTT measurements for each of two signal accounts with blocked/non-
blocked states. We continued this process for 100 times and took the mean
values of the following metrics. We refer to the true blocking rate(TBR)/true
non-blocking rate(TNBR) as the rate of correctly detecting the blocking/non-
blocking user as a blocking/non-blocking user, respectively. Table 4 shows the
results. When k ≥ 20, the detection becomes perfect for all the three services.
Moreover, in a stable environment such as Facebook/Wired, the classification
succeeds perfectly even with k = 3.
6.2 Attack Success Rate in the Wild
We now show the result of our experiment conducted in an environment imi-
tating an actual attack scenario in the wild. We set the length of a bit array
to m = 24, which can cover over 16 million users. In addition, we applied a
Reed-Solomon code with a block length of 4 bits with eight redundant bits,
which enables it to correct one block of error. According to the above setting,
we prepared 34 accounts in total, which included 32 signaling accounts, a closed
account, and an open account, with the appropriate blocking done against the
users on the target list.
Regarding the targets, we assigned a random bit array of length 24 to each
of the 10 social accounts we actually own. We encoded these bit arrays using
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Table 5: Accuracy of the User Identification Attack.
Facebook/wired Twitter/WiFi Tumblr/tethering
TNR 1.00 (20/20) 1.00 (20/20) 0.95 (19/20)
TPR 1.00 (20/20) 1.00 (20/20) 1.00 (20/20)
IDR 0.95 (19/20) 1.00 (20/20) 1.00 (20/20)
IDR/EC 1.00 (20/20) 1.00 (20/20) 1.00 (20/20)
the Reed-Solomon code and calculated the bit arrays assigned as the redundant
bits. We prepared 10 additional accounts which are not included in the list. For
each of the 10 accounts on the target list and the 10 accounts on the non-target
list, we logged in to and accessed the attacker’s website and evaluated if the
account was correctly identified. We repeated the visit two times per account,
resulting in a total of 40 identification trials.
As the parameters for the number of trials, we selected k = 30, which we
experimentally determined yielded good accuracy. The service and network
environment pairs we chose were Facebook/Wired LAN, Twitter/Wireless LAN,
and Tumblr/Tethering. We refer to the TPR as the rate of correctly identifying a
target to be included on the list, and the TNR as the rate of correctly identifying
a non-target to be not included on the list. In addition, of the users who were
identified as being included on the target list, we refer to the identified rate
(IDR) as the rate of correctly identifying the user without the error-correction
code, and refer to the identified rate with error correction (IDR/EC) as a similar
figure but with error correction. In Table 5, we show the classification accuracy
we obtained in this experiment.
The result shows that the experiment succeeded with extremely high accu-
racy. This was expected from the good results we obtained from the experiments
in Section 6.1. For Facebook/Wired, there was one failure case which identified
the target as a wrong user. Examining the network log for this case revealed
that some requests to one of the signaling accounts had returned 502 response
code due to temporary server error. Our script measures the RTT even if an
error code is returned, but since no content is returned, the response time would
not likely be the one desired. This occurred with 3 of the requests over only 1
second of duration, but the RTT value had dropped to about 1/5 of the true
RTT which was enough to cause a bit error. Nevertheless, applying the error-
correction algorithm, we were successfully able to correct this bit which resulted
in the success of identification. Note that, because we adopt the 5th-percentile,
our attack is resilient to outliers which are too late, but it is prone to those
which are too early.
Another case of failure was for Tumblr/Tethering, where a non-target user
was incorrectly identified as a target. This is a rare case where a significant dif-
ference of around p < 0.01 happened to occur when comparing the two sets of
30 non-blocked requests. This example also benefited from the error-correction
algorithm; without error-correction this visitor would have been identified as
another user, but with Reed-Solomon code, although the error was not cor-
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rectable due to too many errors, the error was still detectable. In such a case,
we can still prevent mis-identification by concluding that the membership test
failed and restarting the test.
6.3 Time to Complete the Attack
The shorter the time required for the attack, the more feasible the threat is.
While the total number of requests can be calculated beforehand, the time
required to complete these trials is dependent on the actual RTT; therefore, it
needs to be evaluated experimentally. Figure 7 shows the relationship between
the number of trials and the required time for each service.
The “upper bound” value shown for each service assumes the request with
whichever has the larger of the blocked/non-blocked RTT values, that is, it
assumes the case with the longest time needed for identification; i.e., it is the
worst case. Conversely, the “lower bound” value assumes the request with
whichever has smaller value of the two, that is, it assumes the case with the
shortest time needed for identification; i.e., it is the most optimistic case. The
number of trials issued in parallel was set to 6, which is the default maximum
number of concurrent connections allowed on major browsers such as Chrome,
IE, and Firefox.
The total number of requests needed to make an m-bits decision, or in other
words, to identify the target within 2m users, is mk + 2 × 30 when k0 = 30.
For example, for m = 24, or targeting 16 million users, the total number of
requests needed is 780 when k = 30. This would require 20–50 seconds for
Facebook, 32–98 seconds for Twitter, and 64–68 seconds for Tumblr. According
to Table 4, in the case of Twitter, we have sufficient accuracy even with k = 10.
The number of necessary trials is 300 with this setting, and the time required is
12–37 seconds. Moreover, we can observe that we can achieve sufficient accuracy
even with k = 3 on Facebook. The total number of requests is 132 which only
takes 4–8 seconds.
7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the attack’s principle, practical aspects, known limi-
tations, and ethical considerations.
7.1 Principle of the Attack
We argue that the most fundamental assumption of our attack is the presence
of the visibility control property in the system, that is, “given a multi-user web
service, there exists a way for a (rogue) user to control what other users see,
individually for each user”. To be more formal, the part “what other users
see” can be replaced with “any observable side-effect of the system caused by
a certain action taken by a user”. This assumption combined with a timing
side-channel attack, which enables the attacker to steal this information from
outside the system, is our attack’s big picture. Because closing a side channel
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Figure 7: Number of requests vs. time.
completely is well-known to be difficult, we believe that this visibility-control
assumption is the main principle of this attack. In the case of our scenario,
the ability to build signaling accounts using user blocking corresponds to this
principle.
We stress that other services under this assumption, even those without user
blocking but with a similar mechanism such as group invitations or file access
permissions, may also be subject to a similar class of attack. Still, the social
web/user-blocking example that we used in this paper is by far the most prac-
tical application. This is likely because it satisfies several additional conditions:
(1) the control can be done without the target’s approval or notification and
(2) the control can be done at a fine granularity, i.e., the different bits of in-
formation assignable per user is large. More specifically in our case, condition
(1) is almost always achieved as an inherent nature of user blocking and con-
dition (2) is achieved with unlimited granularity, in theory, via the creation of
an arbitrary number of signaling accounts. Even though we omit further dis-
cussions concerning the presence of other such properties or the exploitability
of similar systems, we believe that there is a need for further study concerning
this subject.
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7.2 Practical Aspects
Here we describe some of the applications and characteristics that extend and
strengthen our attack from a practical perspective.
Identity Linking. User identification is only threatening if the identity is
linked with another piece of information meaningful to the attacker. In the case
of our attack, the most basic form of linking can take the form of linking the
user’s identity with the fact that the user has visited the website prepared for the
attack. In this case, if the web content reflects the visitor’s preference in any way,
it may become a privacy concern. This is suitable not only for advertisement or
access analyses, but also for various social engineering attacks or for blackmailing
those who have accessed sites hosting pornographic content or illegal content
such as pirated software. In addition, our attack can be implemented to reveal
accounts on multiple services simultaneously and linking these accounts together
could significantly worsen the impact of a privacy leak.
Another form of linking occurs when a person is induced to access the web
server via an extra hop through another medium, resulting in a linking between
the target’s identity and the medium used. For example, on a social web service
where the target’s identity is already known, an attacker can send the target a
message containing the URL of the web server. Note that this would allow the
attacker to link even the web services which our attack cannot be applied to.
Similarly, we can link non-web services, such as email or mobile text messages,
which would result in linking an email address or phone number with a social
account. Further, we can also link the target’s physical identity, such as the
target’s physical presence or their residence, by placing or mailing a physical
object, e.g., a poster or a flier, with URL, QR code or NFC tags printed on them.
Note that, even though it may appear that revealing additional identities of a
target when the target’s other identities are already known is not so significant,
it could lead to the identification of a target’s anonymous account that cannot
otherwise be discovered in a straightforward way.
Group Identification. Even though we have focused on the goal of user
identification in this paper, we can easily extend this goal to group identification,
that is, identifying not the user’s exact identity but more general properties
such as gender, nationality, or interests. The attacker could map each user to
a bit array corresponding to the target attribute collected from the structured
information available on the social web service. Note that this can be seen as a
generalization of the user-space partitioning described previously, where a user
space corresponds to a group of users with an arbitrary size mapped to a certain
attribute. Group identification can be used by advertisement providers to track
the visitor’s attributes without unnecessarily revealing their user account. Note
that the number of bits required for group identification would typically be much
lower than that for user identification, making this attack significantly easier to
execute than user identification.
Authentication-backed Identification. One major strength of our approach
is that it is backed by the identity information guaranteed by the authentication
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system of the service, making it resilient against spoofing or misidentification,
both of which many other methodologies suffer from. To give a simple example,
when using an IP address for identification or even tracking, IP spoofing or
ambiguity due to NAT or dynamic IP would interfere with this process. Note
that social web service accounts are increasingly used as a building block in
the modern web’s authentication infrastructure. It is still possible to perform
spoofing and one way is to create an account trying to mimic one’s identity;
however, scrutinizing the account content would usually easily reveal whether it
is a spoofed account. Another way is to use a stolen account, but in this case, the
victim user should be worried about much more serious problems than privacy
leakage. In addition, because authentication is independent of the environment,
it enables cross-environment (e.g., cross-device and cross-browser) identification
and tracking, which is often difficult to achieve using other approaches.
7.3 Limitations
Login State Persistence. Our attack relies heavily on the assumption that
the target user’s service login state is alive while the user browses other websites.
This assumption is reliant on the web cookie mechanism; therefore, the cookie’s
expiration time or the user configuring the browser to clear cookies on closing
the browser may affect the availability of our attack. Social web services, for-
tunately, tend to set a relatively long or even no expiration time, as seen in the
commonly available “keep me logged in” features [12]. This is likely due to the
incentives to service providers from a marketing perspective, e.g., tracking and
advertisement, contrary to security-critical services such as Internet banking
that set a short expiration time. In addition, users would lose the convenience
of being able to access the service without the need to login every time, which
may be a disappointing trade-off, especially for social web services which often
assumes constant usage. Note that, simply determining whether a user is logged
in to certain services can be accomplished in much more lightweight ways [13],
which can also be used in our attack to pre-select the services to be targeted.
Mobile Platform. A non-negligible portion of users today access social web
services from their mobile devices, so whether or not the attack is feasible in this
realm is an important question to explore. For recent mobile platforms such as
Android and iOS, the mechanics of most web browsers as well as the effective
performance of the hardware and network are not significantly different from
those of a PC; therefore, they are expected to yield sufficient RTT differences
making our attack feasible. We partially proved this in our experiment with
the tethering environment. The primary concern instead is the unique software
ecosystem of mobile devices: many services encourage users to use a service-
dedicated app instead of a browser to access their service. Even though some
collaborative features such as social plug-ins or single sign-on may still urge some
mobile users to log on via a browser, this ecosystem will surely limit the target
coverage of our attack to a certain degree. We believe that a possible attack
vector for this scenario which may need an attention might be an exploitation
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of a mobile platform-specific side channel, e.g., Android’s Intent and shared
memory [14], to bypass the app sandbox, analogical to how our attack exploited
a browser timing side channel to bypass the same-origin policy, but we leave
further discussions on this for a future study.
Limits on Blocking. For most services, limitations on the total number of
users allowed to be blocked or the rate at which blocking requests can be is-
sued from a single account are not explicitly stated. We have experimentally
confirmed that at least ten million users on Twitter and three million users
on Facebook and Tumblr were actually blockable over five days using a sin-
gle account, and only DeviantArt and eBay seems to have had a limit on the
maximum number of blocks per account. Also, Instagram appears to have had
a limitation on the rate, i.e, the number of accounts that can be blocked per
minute. As we have shown in Section 2.2, neither disabling blocking nor pos-
ing a limit on it, is desirable from the viewpoints of the actual usage of the
service and users’ expectations. However, having limits on the total number of
users to be blocked blocking may interfere with the process of building a high-
coverage signaling account. Still, user-space partitioning would help alleviate
this limitation and much of the effort for building signaling accounts is required
just once, implying that attackers are not so exceedingly time-constrained when
performing this task.
Length of Visit. As shown in Section 6, the attack can be executed in a realis-
tically short time. In certain circumstances, however, such as when the RTT is
high or when there is a need to use user-space partitioning, which increases the
number of requests, it may be difficult to keep the user on the same webpage
long enough for the JavaScipt code to finish. Even if the attack duration is
short, because the behavior of a user is often unpredictable, a shorter attack
is always preferable. A trivial approach to this problem is to prepare webpage
content that is sufficiently “attractive” to cause the users to stay longer, but
this is very user specific. Another solution is to save and restore the attack
state between multiple attack sessions. By having the JavaScript code send
partial results to the server as it attacks, even if the attack terminates before
finishing, the attack can be resumed at another session from where it left off.
Training data may be reused or not depending on the “distance” between each
attack session, e.g., the time elapsed between sessions. Another solution is to
open pop-up windows in the background or a tab and execute the attack there,
hoping that the user would not notice or care to close it immediately.
7.4 Ethics
In Section 2.2, all the data have been collected with user consent, and we fol-
lowed guidelines presented by the ethics committee of Waseda University.
To evaluate the feasibility and impact of the attack techniques on social web
service users, experimenting with attacks on actual social web services cannot
be avoided. All attacks in our experiment were checked manually and only
generated a restricted amount of request. As a result, our experiment was
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carefully controlled and only generated a restricted amount of traffic (requests),
which did not increase the workload of the sites and did not undermine the
quality of their services. Furthermore, our experiment performed against our
own accounts. Therefore, actual users of the services we examined were not
directly involved in our attacks.
Even though the attack technique in this paper does not arise from a specific
social web service, according to the principle of responsible disclosure, we have
reported the details of our attacks and the experimental results to the relevant
social web service providers and browser vendors to mitigate the attacks and
improve future security design of social web. Several service providers and
browser vendors have already finished implementing defenses and some are in
the process.
8 Defense
In this section, we discuss defensive measures that can be taken against our
attack. We emphasize that all approaches we are currently aware of either cause
a serious degradation in the service quality or require considerable amounts of
time and effort before being implemented or widely adopted. Nevertheless, we
believe that raising the bar for an attacker would still be beneficial to the public.
8.1 Server-side Defenses
Token Validation. Token-based defenses are widely adopted to prevent CSRF
attacks in general. The server appends a one-time random string, or token, to
each URL link generated and verifies it when the link is accessed. This prevents
any third-party from generating a valid link; therefore, the attacker will not be
able to receive valid responses containing information useful for the attack as
long as the token-checking process is applied before the block checking at the
server side. A major drawback of this defense is that legitimate requests are
also affected and result in consequences such as breaking search engine results
or prohibiting any means of link sharing, including those on blog posts and
emails. Promising approaches which acquire user contents by using JavaScript’s
XMLHttpRequest with a valid token such as placeholder [9] and double-submit
cookie [15] have been proposed, but they still require a change in the system
architecture design and also the delay caused by the extra hop may negatively
affect the user experience.
Response Time Control. The server could adjust the response time to mini-
mize the block/non-block RTT difference. One approach is to artificially equal-
ize the response times by adding delays to whichever has the shorter response
time. Another approach is to randomize the response time by injecting delays
of random lengths. However, either approach would impose a non-negligible
performance degradation experienced by the user. In general, this type of tim-
ing side-channel defense is difficult to perfect; the profound study results in this
area provide advanced attackers with various ways to amplify such differences
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at the cost of some increased effort, as we also have exemplified in this paper.
In addition, the network delay is often uncontrollable from the service side so a
perfect control is difficult to attain from the server side. Note that such types of
server-side defenses are often thwarted by other timing side-channel approaches,
such as those leveraging the content cache [9].
Usage Restriction. Our attack, when implemented in a straightforward man-
ner, may exhibit behavioral characteristics not usually seen in the normal usage
of the service. One case of such an anomaly would occur in the preparation
process of a signaling account, which requires a massive number of blocking
requests to be issued within a short time. Another is in the process of launching
the attack from a browser, which causes an abnormal number of GET requests
to be issued. The service can either restrict this in the form of the rate limit,
CAPTCHA, or some means of heuristic anomaly detection. However, these
defenses are expected to function only as a mild mitigation, because advanced
attackers have historically been able to circumvent these types of defenses. The
most extreme form of restriction is to remove the user-blocking capability from
the service. All these types of restriction-based measures, however, lead to an
undermining of the ability to suppress those who truly needs to be blocked,
which may result in a degradation of the service quality.
8.2 Client-side Defenses
User. Defenses that can be taken by a user alone are limited to quite trivial
ones. One approach is to isolate the browsing environment in which the web ser-
vice is used, from that used for other purposes. This can be done, for example,
by using the private browsing feature commonly available in modern browsers,
logging out of the service when not in use, or simply using a different browser.
Another approach is to restrict the execution of JavaScript using browser plug-
ins such as NoScript [16], which would severely impair the attacker’s capability
to carry out such an attack. Obviously, all of these measures greatly increase the
user’s cost of not only using the service but also web browsing in general. Fur-
ther, it would deactivate some features such as social plug-ins or advertisements
that benefit both of the user and the service provider.
Web Browser. SameSite [17] is a cookie attribute that allows flexible control
of sending cookies in cross-site requests. This interferes with the functionality
of some social plug-ins, but otherwise it is a very elegant solution. To use this
feature, it is necessary for the browser adopting it, and the web service explicitly
declare it in the HTTP header.
Equalizing the response times, for example, by injecting delays to the pro-
cessing time, is also a possible measure that can be taken on the browser side.
Further, the detection of anomalies such as frequent errors resulting from failed
rendering may be another option. However, these approaches are often only
viable for a certain class of timing side channels; they tend to be thwarted
eventually by other newly developed timing attacks using different approaches,
as exemplified by the attack using the browser cache mentioned in another
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study [9].
9 Related Work
We present previous studies concerning timing attacks, which is the fundamen-
tal technique of our method uses to compromise user’s privacy. In addition,
we introduce other side-channel leaks based on the browser functionality and
methods to identify and track users.
9.1 Web-based Timing Attacks
A timing attack is one type of side-channel attack that has been studied pri-
marily in cryptography for more than two decades. It typically exploits the
execution time or power consumption of a cryptosystem to infer secret key and
private information [18, 19]. Studies of timing attacks have expanded to web-
based systems regardless of the cryptosystem that exploits the communication
time and size of the web content. Bortz et al. presented a pioneer work on
web-based timing attacks; they classified web-based timing attacks into direct
timing and cross-site timing [4]. Our proposed method is classified as a web-
based cross-site timing attack.
A direct timing attack directly measures the response times from a system,
e.g., a website, to extract private information from a system. Bortz et al. pro-
posed a method to expose valid user names and the number of private photos
from a website by measuring the response time of HTTP [4].
Cross-site timing attacks indirectly measure the response times or content
size of web on a browser to extract private information from a browser or web-
site. It enables a malicious website to obtain information about the target
browser’s view of another website using cross-site content that often violates
the same-origin policy [20]. Methods to break the same-origin policy and their
countermeasures have been presented since 2000 [21–24]; however, the many of
cross-origin techniques are still effective on modern web browsers. Liang et al.
leveraged several CSS features to indirectly monitor the rendering of a target re-
source [25]. Goethem et al. proposed a cache-based timing attack using HTML5
functionalities, which can bypass the same-origin policy, to estimate the size of
a cross-origin resource [9]. Gelernter et al. presented a cross-site search attack
on well-known web services to distinguish between the loading time of empty
and full responses, which enables an attacker to distinguish sensitive data of
target users in the records of the web services [26]. Jia et al. demonstrated a
geo-location inference attack on well-known web services, by using the load time
of location-sensitive resources left by geography-specific websites (e.g., Google’s
local domain) [27]. Our method is not new in the context of cross-site at-
tacks; however, the idea is unique in that user blocking, which is a fundamental
functionality of social webs, can be used to distinguish between blocked and,
consequently, to identify their social accounts.
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9.2 Side-channel Leaks on Browsers
A side-channel attack on a browser without timing features is another class of
privacy attack. To infer the status of a cross-origin resource, Lee et al. developed
a URL status identification attack using ApplicationCache that exploits cross-
origin resource caching [13] and they suggested advanced privacy threats using
this attack, e.g., login status determination and internal web server probing. A
history-stealing attack is a typical attack that extracts the browsing history of
URLs [10,28]. This attack depends on the fact that a web browser handles CSS
properties of URL hyperlinks differently depending on whether the URL was
previously accessed by the web browser [29], which leads to allowing a client-
side script to access such properties. To fix this, Baron proposed a solution that
blocks scripts from accessing the CSS properties of hyperlinks, and all popular
browsers (e.g., Firefox, Chrome, Safari, and IE) have adopted this solution. As
a result, this type of history stealing attack no longer works in the latest versions
of these browsers [30,31].
9.3 Social Account Identification
While various methods have been proposed to effectively track browsers on the
Internet (e.g., cookies, browser cache, and browser fingerprints [32–34]), these
tracking methods focus on identifying distinct browsers rather than the user of
the browsers. The goal of our proposed method is to identify the user (i.e., the
social account) which differs from the above browser tracking methods. Many
of the studies introduced in Sections 9.1 and 9.2 mentioned that their proposed
methods could be used for inferring the status of social account or identifying
social account [4, 10, 13]. The difference of response time of login page was
used for inferring account validity [4]. With a similar motivation, conditional
redirections of the HTTP URLs was used for distinguishing whether a victim
web browser is logged in to the web service [13]. The combination of group
membership information, e.g., group ID or group directory in browser’s access
history, was used for identifying a social account [10]. These differences are ex-
tracted from previously provided pages, e.g., login pages and group membership
pages. In contrast, our method is unique in that an attacker can fully control
the visibility of pages in order to create discriminable differences.
10 Conclusion
This work presents a practical side-channel attack that identifies the social ac-
count of a user visiting the attacker’s website. It exploits the user-blocking
mechanism, or the visibility control property, commonly available in most so-
cial web services today to create a controllable side channel that provides the
attacker with complete and flexible control over the leaked information, be it
informative enough to uniquely identify the user or be it highly resilient to
noise. With experiments, we demonstrated that our attack is in fact applicable
to current mainstream social web services today and we argued that defending
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against this threat would not be easy without imposing a negative impact on
the relevant services. It is ironic that the blocking feature designed to suppress
harmful users can now be turned against harmless users; some form of mitiga-
tion is urgent and a reworking of the design of this feature is suggested as a
future work.
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